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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3) and 78-2a-3 (1953, as amended) this civil 
appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court and Mr. Bergman's appeal 
(20080751-CA) was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78A-3-102 and 78A-4-103, on September 29, 2008. 
PARTIES 
1. Debbie A. Burke ("Ms. Burke") was, at all times relevant, a resident of Ogden, 
Weber County and/or Duchesne, Duchesne County, Utah. 
2. Mark D. Bergman ("Mr. Bergman") was, at all times relevant, a resident of 
Ogden, Weber County, Utah. 
3. Dorene R. Basug, and First American Title have been dismissed from this case. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Burke owned real property located in Weber County, Utah, described as: Lot 496, 
RON-CLARE VILLAGE NO. 5, Ogden City, Weber County, Utah (the "Property"). Record at 
pages 4,24, 74, and 81. In order to sell the Property, Ms. Burke and her husband, Vince Isbell 
("Mr. Isbell"), listed the Property with Laura Streble ("Ms. Streble"), who is Mr. Bergman's 
wife, through Val R. Iverson Realty ("VRIR") on a Multi State Listing. Prior to selling the 
Property, Ms. Burke and Mr. Isbell agreed to let Mr. Bergman perform some clean-up and repairs 
on the Property. At no time during Ms. Burke and Mr. Isbell's conversations with Mr. Bergman 
about the clean-up and repairs on the Property did either Ms. Burke and/or Mr. Isbell offer Mr. 
Bergman a full time job working on the Property. Ms. Burke and Mr. Isbell's discussions did not 
include an offer of employment for a specific number of hours, a specific amount of money per 
hour, or that they would pay any amount of Mr. Bergman's taxes. 
On or about October 27, 2003, Mr. Bergman filed a lien on the Property in the amount of 
$28,675.00 ("Lien"). Attached as Exhibit "A" to the Complaint. Record at page 8. On or 
about April 1, 2004, Mr. Bergman filed his complaint with the district court in Weber County, 
Utah ("Complaint"). Record at pages 1-11. Mr. Bergman also recorded a Lis Pendens on or 
about April 6, 2004. Record at pages 12 - 13. The Complaint is entitled "Complaint to 
Foreclose MechaLnics's Lien." Record at pages 1-11. Mr. Bergman asserted a single cause of 
action in his Complaint claiming he was entitled to foreclose his mechanics' lien under Utah's 
mechanics' lien statute. Id. Ms, Burke was served with a summons and the Complaint on or 
about June 18, 2004. Record at page 22. Ms. Burke filed her Answer and Counterclaim on or 
about August 12, 2004. Record at pages 23 - 28. Mr. Bergman filed his Answer to the 
Counterclaim on or about August 25, 2004. Record at pages 30 - 31. 
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On or about January 23, 2004, Dorene R. Basug, purchased the Property from Ms. Burke, 
prior to the Complaint being filed Record at pages 38 - 55. First American Title, the title 
company for the sale, were dismissed from the case after depositing $28,675.00 with the district 
court, based on a stipulation of the parties on or about October 21, 2004. Record at pages 56 -
57. 
Mr. Bergman did not prosecute his case from October 2004, August of 2005. See the 
Record. Ms. Burke filed her Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents on or 
about August 4, 2005. Record at pages 73 -108. Ms. Burke was asking the district court to 
determine that the Lien was invalid due to deficiencies in the Lien itself. Record at page 8. Mr. 
Bergman filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Debbie Burke's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and supporting documentation on or about August 22, 2005. Record at 
pages 109 - 22. Ms. Burke filed the Defendant Debbie A. Burke's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant Debbie A. Burke's Motion for summary Judgment. Record at pages 123 -
35. The court held a hearing on Ms. Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment on December 15, 
2005. Record at page 141. Counsel for Ms. Burke sent a letter to the district court and 
opposing counsel concerning the Court of Appeals' decisions in Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT. 
App. 383) September 9, 2005, and Sill v. Hart, 2005 UT. App. 537 (December 15, 2005), a copy 
of the Sill decision and a copy of Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 were attached to the letter. 
Record at pages 142-52. Counsel for Mr. Bergman filed a letter dated December 20, 2005, 
discussing the Pearson and Sill cases. He also discussed Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a), Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(h), and Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(16) and provided copies of those 
code sections. Record at pages 153 - 55. Counsel for Mr. Bergman also filed a letter dated 
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December 5, 2005, but was filed in the Record on January 12, 2006, including a copy of the 
Pearson case. Record at pages 156 - 60. On or about January 19, 2006, the court denied Ms. 
Burke's Motion for Summary Judgement. Record at pages 161 - 65. The order denying the 
Motion for Summary Judgement was filed on or about February 24, 2006. Record at pages 166 
- 69. Once again, Mr. Bergman failed to prosecute his case, and the district court filed a Notice 
of Intent to Dismiss on or about December 7, 2006. Record at pages 170 - 71. Mr. Bergman 
filed his Statement of Plaintiff in Response to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss and 
Request for Permission to hold Rule 26, Scheduling Conference of the Parties' on December 21, 
2006. Record at pages 172-75. 
At the telephonic conference held by the district court on February 28, 2007, in addition 
to scheduling the trial and dates associated there with, a discovery cut-off date, which was set for 
July 7, 2007. Record at pages 179 - 83. On or about June 13, 2007, Ms. Burke sent Debbie A. 
Burke's First Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests and Debbie A Burke!s First Set of 
Requests for Admission to Plaintiff to Mr. Bergman. Record at pages and 184 - 85,188 - 89. 
Mr. Bergman failed to send any discovery of any type to Ms. Burke at any time during the case. 
Mr. Bergman filed his Certificate of Service of the Plaintiffs Answers to Defendant Debbie A. 
Burke's First Set of Interrogatories and Responses to Request for Production of Documents on 
July 31, 2007. Record at page 190. Mr. Bergman also filed his Certificate of Service of the 
Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant Debbie A. Burke's First Set of Requests for Admissions. 
Record at page 191. After trying to work out some discovery issues between the attorneys, Ms. 
Burke filed a Motion to Compel, and supporting documents, more complete answers and/or 
response to the discovery, on October 1, 2007. Record at pages 192-93 and 197 - 272. 
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The district court conducted a two day bench trial on or about November 13, and 14, 
2007. Record at pages 312 - 14. Due to time constraints, the district court requested the 
attorneys submit written closing arguments. On or about November 21, 2007, Mr. Bergman filed 
the Plaintiffs Closing Argument. Record at pages 317 - 25. Ms. Burke filed the Defendant 
Debbie A. Burke's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss on November 23, 2007. 
Record at pages 326 - 51. On or about November 23, 2007, Ms. Burke filed the Defendant 
Debbie A. Burke's Closing argument. Record at pages 352 - 70. Through a telephonic 
conference, the district court issued its Ruling on the trial. Record at page 373. The district 
court issued its Judgment on January 16, 2008. Record at pages 374 - 78. Counsel for Mr. 
Bergman signed off and approved the Judgment as to form and content. Record at page 377. 
On or about January 24, 2008, Mr. Bergman filed the Plaintiffs Notice of Release of 
Counsel and Representing Pro Se. Record at pages 379 - 80. On the same day, Mr. Bergman 
filed a Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment with the supporting documents. Record at pages 
381 - 86. The district court issued it memorandum decision granting Plaintiffs motion to allow 
Michael F. Olmstead to withdraw as counsel and denied the Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend 
the Judgment, on or about March 4, 2008. Record at pages 408 - 09. 
Ms. Burke filed Burke's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Affidavit of Attorneys' 
Fees and supporting documents on March 6, 2008, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). 
Record at pages 410 - 60. On or about March 13, 2008, Mr. Bergman filed his Motion 
Requesting Court to Classify and Seal Court Documents and his Memorandum in Opposition of 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and supporting documents. Record at pages 471 - 89. 
On or about April 3, 2008, Mr. Bergman filed his Motion Presenting New Conclusive Evidence 
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Relating to the Defendant Committing Fraud upon the Court and his Affidavit in Support of 
Motion Presenting New Conclusive Evidence and supporting documents. Record at pages 514 -
31. 
On or about April 7, 2008, Mr. Bergman filed his Notice of Appeal and his Affidavit of 
Impecuniosity. Record at pages 532 - 33. The district court issued its Memorandum Decision 
denying Ms. Burke's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Mr. Bergman's Motion 
Requesting the Court to Classify and Seal Court Documents on or about April 8, 2008. Record 
at pages 539 - 40. On or about April 25, 2006, Ms. Burke filed Burke's Objection to the Motion 
Presenting New Conclusive Evidence Relating to the Defendant Committing Fraud Upon the 
Court. Record at pages 555 - 62. 
On or about May 12, 2008, the district court issued its decisions on Mr. Bergman's Order 
on Plaintiffs Notice of Release of Counsel and Representing Pro Se and Motion to Alter or 
Amend a Judgment and Order on Plaintiffs Motion Requesting the Court to Clarify and Seal 
Court Documents and Burke's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. Record at pages 564 - 69. 
Ms. Burke filed her Notice of Appeal on or about May 13, 2008. Record at pages 570 - 80. 
Mr. Bergman filed a Motion to Remove Stay on Judgment on or about August 1, 2008. 
Record at pages 592 - 96. On or about August 7, 2008, the district court issued its Ruling 
Denying Plaintiffs Rule 60 (b) Motion. Record at pages 597 - 99. Mr. Bergman filed his 
Notice of Appeal and his Affidavit of Impecuniously on or about September 2, 2008. Record at 
pages 600-11. 
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DEBBIE A. BURKE'S RESPONSE 
MR. BERGMAN'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ms. Burke will respond to the Mr. Bergman's "Statement of Facts" even though his 
statement of facts not in the normal format. First it should be pointed out that Mr. Bergman has 
failed to provide any evidence of the allegations contained in his Statement of Facts. He failed to 
cite to the record at all in his Statement of Facts. 
First, Mr. Bergman asserts that May 12 and 13, 2008, "play a very important role 
throughout the following brief and the Plaintiff requests that such date be given special interest." 
See Appellant's/Plaintiffs brief at page 15. Mr. Bergman never claims that he has first hand 
knowledge of the events he asserts took place at the Weber County Courthouse on May 12, 2008. 
He has not provided this Court or any other court with any evidence that the series of events that 
he claims took place on May 12, 2008, ever happened and/or happen as he alleges. He has failed 
to provide an affidavit from anyone that was there to support his "Statement of Facts." 
Mr. Bergman's statement that counsel for Ms. Burke has an improper ex parte 
communication with the Honorable Judge Parley R. Baldwin ("Judge Baldwin") is simply wrong. 
The claimed discussion between Ms. Burke's counsel and Judge Baldwin never took place. 
Since that communication never took place, any alleged outcomes from that communications are 
wrong and could not follow. 
May 12. 2008 
1. The trial court clerk's two entries correctly reflect what took place on that day 
according to her experience and direct from the trial court. The trial court executed the four 
orders on May 12, 2008. Record at pages 564 - 69. What Mr. Bergman did or did not do with 
respect to his inquiries about the order is unknown to Ms, Burke. Mr. Bergman failed to explain 
whether he communicated directly with Judge Baldwin or with his clerk about the status of the 
orders. Since Ms. Burke's counsel did not have an ex parte communicate with Judge Baldwin, 
he is unaware of what if anything he was told or if his inquiries "fell on deaf ears at the court." 
2. Once again, because Ms. Burke's counsel did not speak with Judge Baldwin, Ms. 
Burke and her counsel have no knowledge of what Judge Baldwin did or may have said to his 
clerk about any entries on the court docket. Unless otherwise proven, Judge Baldwin's clerk 
made the entries she was instructed to make. 
3. Ms. Burke's counsel did not speak with Judge Baldwin, therefore, Ms. Burke and 
her counsel have no knowledge of what Judge Baldwin did or may have said to his clerk about 
any entries on the court docket. Unless otherwise proven, Judge Baldwin's clerk made the 
entries she was instructed to make. 
4. The docket does not identify who requested the copies or paid for them. 
May 13. 2008 
5. Ms. Burke's counsel did file a Notice of Appeal and pay the filing fee on May 13, 
2008. Ms. Burke's Notice of Appeal was sent to Mr. Bergman pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedures. Her Notice of Appeal did in fact have a copy of the trial court's order dated 
May 12, 2008. 
The claimed "real court orders" are located at the Record at pages 564 - 69. Ms. Burke's 
Notice of Appeal can be found at the Record at pages 570 - 80. Ms. Burke only appealed the 
trial court's May 12, 2008, Order on Plaintiffs Motion Requesting the Court to Clarify and Seal 
Court Documents and Burke's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and was attached as Exhibit 
"B" to Ms. Burke's Notice of Appeal. Record at pages 578 - 80. The two copies are identical 
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except for the signature pages. The clerk stamped the copy of that Order and provided it to Ms. 
Burke's counsel. 
The Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, was signed by Judge Baldwin on or abnout 
February 24, 2006. Record at pages 573 - 76. This Order is attached as Exhibit "A" to Ms. 
Burke's Notice of Appeal. Id. The court's file does not contain any "fake court orders." Mr. 
Bergman has not provided any evidence that any documents included in the district court's file 
are fake and/or were not executed by the trial court or stamped pursuant to the court's direction. 
Mr. Bergman first alleges that there was an improper communication and/or collusion 
between Judge Baldwin and Ms. Burke' counsel and then he asserts that the same court's orders 
are fake. 
Whether Judge Baldwin was on the bench on May 12, 2008, is of no consequence. Mr. 
Bergman insinuates that since Judge Baldwin was not on the bench that day that his 
interpretation of the "facts" is "viable and a highly likely scenario of the actual events that 
occurred." See Appellant's/Plaintiffs brief at page 17. 
The "STAMPED Court Orders" 
1. Ms. Burke's counsel did not receive the copies of the executed orders via U.S. 
mail. He received those orders from Judge Baldwin's clerk on May 12, 2008. 
2. There are only eight entries on the court's docket between May 8, 2008 and Maey 
15, 2008. All of the entries relate to the trial court's orders, copying of those orders and filing of 
Ms. Burke's Notice of Appeal. 
3. Ms. Burke's counsel went to the District Court in Weber County on May 12, 
2008, in order to check on the status of the orders that had been submitted for the trial court's 
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signature. Counsel arrived at the courthouse to learn that the order had already been signed by 
the court earlier that day. Ms. Burke's counsel requested copies of those orders and was 
provided those copies by the clerk. Counsel paid for those copies as indicated on the court 
docket. However, no communications took place between Judge Baldwin and Ms. Burke's 
counsel concerning this case. 
4. Judge Baldwin, District Court Clerks, and/or Ms. Burke's counsel have NOT 
"plotted to cause the Plaintiff harm during trial." Mr. Bergman's claim that "Defense Counsel 
has involved an officer of the court" is simply a bare unsubstantiated allegation and is wrong and 
unsupported by any type of evidence. NO actions, during the entire course of Mr. Bergman's 
case, taken by Judge Baldwin, any of the District Court Clerks, and/or Ms. Burke's counsel were 
"a violation of court rules and Utah law." Nothing done by Judge Baldwin, any of the District 
Court Clerks, and/or Ms. Burke's counsel has prejudiced the impartiality of the court system or 
has corrupted the courts' functions as an independent arbitrator of facts in civil matters. 
Specifically, no actions by Judge Baldwin, District Court Clerks, and/or Ms. Burke's counsel 
improperly or legally compromised Mr. Bergman's case. Mr. Bergman's allegation are 
unsupported by any evidence of any form or by any citation to the court's record. 
5. The Rule 60(b) motion filed by Mr. Bergman had no merit. The granting or 
denying of Mr. Berman's 60(b) motion is in the sound discretion of the trial court. The 
implication of Mr. Bergman's "Statement Fact" number 5 is that there was some improper 
collaboration between Judge Baldwin and Ms. Burke's counsel to deny Mr. Bergman's Rule 
60(b) motion. Ms. Burke's counsel had no contact with the trial court clerks or judges after May 
13, 2008, through the time Judge Baldwin ruled on Mr. Bergman's Rule 60(b) motion. Ms. 
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Burke, her counsel, and the witnesses that testified at the November 2007, trial, did NOT commit 
fraud, subordinate perjury, or submit false evidence. The district court and Ms. Burke's counsel 
did not and would not do anything improper as it relates to Mr. Bergman's case and/or the trial of 
his claim. Mr. Bergman presented no evidence, because there is none, to support his allegations 
and claims in any of his post-trial motions. In particular, Mr. Bergman did not provide any 
evidence that Judge Baldwin and Ms. Burke's counsel had any improper or inappropriate 
communications ever, let alone concerning his case. Mr. Bergman failed to demonstrate, with 
evidence, the Judge Baldwin and Ms. Burke's counsel exchanged anything in order for Judge 
Baldwin to take the actions theorized by Mr. Bergman. In other words, why or for what would 
Judge Baldwin gain for acting as alleged by Mr Bergman? What would Ms. Burke's counsel 
offer or give to Judge Baldwin for his help in defeating Mr. Bergman's line foreclosure action. If 
Ms. Burke's counsel and Judge Baldwin were in league together, then why did Judge Baldwin 
deny Ms. Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment? It would have been easier to short cut Mr. 
Bergman's case at that point rather than going through a trial. 
Judge Baldwin did not "willfully, knowingly, and with intent violate court rules, break 
the law, violated the sanctity of the bench" or cause " material harm to the Plaintiff or engineer 
"a break down of the judicial process to aid the Defendant in the case." There is no evidence that 
Judge Baldwin violated any Utah Statute, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Code of Judicial 
Conduct, or Rule of Professional Conduct, which governs the administration of justice of any 
civil case. The only information Mr. Bergman offers to support his wild conclusions is the 
court's docket. He believes that there is only one explanation for the entries on the district 
court's docket, which he discusses at length in his brief. Mr. Bergman provides his interpretation 
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of the docket in order to reach his predetermined conclusions without any supporting 
information. 
Mr. Bergman's claim that "Defense Counsel met with the Trial Judge ex-parte on May 
12, 2008, and the Trial Judge made a decision concerning the Plaintiffs 60(b) motion." He 
reaches this conclusion simply by reading the court's docket. The claimed meeting between Ms. 
Burke's Counsel and Judge Baldwin did not take place on May 12, 2008, or any other day. Ms. 
Burke's counsel never met ex parte with Judge Baldwin before, during, or after Mr. Bergman's 
case was file and prosecuted. 
Ms. Burke is without any knowledge of Mr. Bergman's actions and/or communications 
with the district court clerks, Court Administrator, Brent Johnson, and/or the Utah Judicial 
Counsel. Counsel from Ms. Burke was unaware of any of Ms. Bergman's efforts until reading 
his appellate brief with its exhibit "A", which is the letter he wrote to Mr. Johnson and/or Pat 
Bartholomew. Mr. Bergman did not provide copies of his letter or other efforts to communicate 
with authorities concerning his case and Judge Baldwin contemporaneous with his actions. 
Mr. Bergman attempts to bootstrap his argument from an ex parte meeting between Ms. 
Burke's counsel and Judge Baldwin to a denial of justice to him and his case. He asserts that the 
only reason that Judge Baldwin denied his Rule 60(b) motion was because of some sort of 
agreement between the Judge and Ms Burke's counsel. He attempt to intermingle his wild 
allegations of an ex parte meeting with some legal authority concerning the damage such a 
meeting would cause to the judicial system in order to deflect the lack of factual and legal basis 
to support his claims in his case. His ultimate goal is have this Court set aside the trial court's 
judgment, which is the same subject of Mr. Bergman's first appeal, Court of Appeals case 
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number 20080323. Neither the trial court nor Ms. Burke's counsel intended to defraud Mr. 
Bergman. The results of the trial and all of Mr. Bergman's post-trial motions did not defraud 
him of anything. Judge Baldwin conducted the case in an impartial manner. The trial was 
prosecuted, presented, and decided on only the facts presented through witnesses and properly 
offered and admitted documentary evidence at that trial. The only information provided to Judge 
Baldwin concerning Ms. Burkes claims and defenses was through the witnesses, the exhibits 
admitted at trial, and the written closing arguments requested by the court. Each motion filed by 
Mr. Bergman was brief by both sides and decided on its merits by Judge Baldwin alone. 
In his brief, Mr. Bergman alleges that Ms. Burke had something to gain if her counsel had 
communicated with Judge Baldwin in an ex parte manner. Ms. Burke and her counsel 
strenuously deny that any ex parte communications took place between counsel and the Judge. 
However, his argument that the motivation for the Judge's participation in this alleged 
conspiracy was to cover up some sort of defect in his administration of Mr. Bergman's case. Mr. 
Bergman cannot accept that he failed at extracting more money from Ms. Burke than the district 
court awarded him during the trial. Judge Baldwin determined that Mr. Isbell was the most 
credible witness during the trial and that this belief was the basis for his decision and awards to 
the parties. Mr. Bergman fired his attorney once the trial court issued it decision and the 
Judgment was signed and entered. 
Mr. Bergman also argues that Ms. Burke's counsel committed fraud on the court. This 
allegation stems from his belief that in order to prove payments to him of cash by Ms. Burke, 
during the trial, that Ms. Burke was required to prove this fact only through documentary 
evidence and that oral testimony of two or three witnesses was inadequate. In the same breath, 
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Mr. Bergman failed to provide any documentary evidence of the number of hours he claimed to 
have worked on Ms. Burke's home. All he provided during the trial was an estimate of his time. 
He had no contemporaneous documents evidencing his time and what type of work was 
performed. Nevertheless, he seeks to impose one standard for Ms. Burke and one standard for 
himself. 
Judge Baldwin and/or counsel for Ms. Burke did NOT purposefully or recklessly 
disregard of any procedural safeguards during Mr. Bergman's case, which would result in the 
deprivation of any of his substantive rights. No actions taken or not taken by Judge Baldwin 
and/or Ms. Burke's counsel during Mr. Bergman's prosecution of his case would constitute an 
impermissible corruption of the court process. 
Mr. Bergman's factual, legal, and procedural claims are so intermingled as to make them 
nonsensical. Each of his arguments are circular in nature and depending on the others for 
support. Based on Mr. Bergman's arguments, he postulates that he does not require to marshal 
any evidence in support of his assertions. He beliefs that his claims are so plain and apparent that 
he does not need to provide any factual evidence of his positions. His beliefs should be enough 
for this Court to grant his wish. 
All allegations by Mr. Bergman concerning ex parte communications, fraud by Ms. 
Burke, fraud on the court by Ms. Burke, or fraud committed by officers of the court are bare 
allegations and unsubstantiated claims or beliefs. Mr. Bergman needs someone other than 
himself to blame for his case's outcome. 
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DEBBIE A. BURKE'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts, taken from the lower court's record, are pertinent to the issues raised 
on appeal: 
1. Ms. Burke owned real property located in Weber County, Utah, described as: Lot 
496, RON-CLARE VILLAGE NO. 5, Ogden City, Weber County, Utah (the "Property").. 
Record at pages 4, 24, 74, and 81. 
2. In order to sell the Property, Ms. Burke and her husband, Mr. Isbell, listed the 
Property with Laura Streble ("Ms. Streble"), who is Mr. Bergman's wife, through Val R. Iverson 
Realty ("VRIR") on a Multi State Listing. Record at pages 74 and 81. 
3. Prior to trying to sell the Property, Ms. Burke and Mr. Isbell agreed to let Mr. 
Bergman perform some clean-up and repairs on the Property. Id. 
4. Mr. Bergman had been employed in the construction industry, but was out of 
work during May and June, 2003. Id. 
5. At no time during Ms. Burke and Mr. Isbell's conversations with Mr. Bergman 
about the clean-up and repairs on the Property did either Ms. Burke and/or Mr. Isbell offer Mr. 
Bergman a full time job working on the Property. Id. 
6. Ms. Burke and Mr. Isbell's discussions did not include an offer of employment for 
a specific number of hours, a specific amount of money per hour, or that we would pay any 
amount of Mr. Bergman's taxes. Record at pages 74 and 81-82. 
7. The clean-up and repairs of the Property were performed during May and June, 
2003. Record at pages 75 and 82. 
8. Mr. Bergman had been paid in full for all work authorized to be performed on the 
Property. Id. 
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9. During that conversation, I asked Mr. Bergman for an itemized list of his hours 
and the materials he was claiming as part of his demand, which he has never produced. Record 
at pages 75. 
10. On or about October 27, 2003, Mr. Bergman filed a lien on the Property in the 
amount of $28,675.00. Record at page 8. 
11. On or about April 1, 2004, Mr. Bergman filed his single cause Complaint with the 
District Court in Weber County. Record at pages 1-11 
12. A bench trial in this matter was held on or about November 13 and 14, 2007. 
Record at pages 312 - 13. 
13. On or about January 9, 2008, the district court, through a telephone conference, 
issued its decision to the parties counsel and Mr. Isbell, who was with counsel or Ms. Burke. 
Record at page 373. 
14. The district court issued its Judgment on or about January 16, 2008. Record at 
pages 374 - 78. 
15. Mr. Bergman's counsel signed off on the Judgment, when he approved it as to 
"Form and Content." Record at page 377. 
16. The parties did not reach a meeting of the minds. Record at pages 374 - 78. 
17. The parties did not have a written contract. Id. 
18. The Court found that Mr. Isbell was the most credible witness during the trial. Id. 
19. Mr. Isbell is a licensed contractor and was at Ms. Burke's home almost on a 
weekly basis to review the work performed by Mr. Bergman. Id. 
20. Mr. Isbell provided the adequate supervision over Mr. Bergman for the work 
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performed by Mr. Bergman. Id. 
21. Mr. Isbell estimated the cost for the work to be performed to improve the value of 
Ms. Burke's home was between $5,000.00 and $8,000.00. Id. 
22. The court found that the total value of the labor and materials provided to Ms. 
Burke, by Mr. Bergman, was $7,500.00. Id. 
23. Ms. Burke paid Mr. Bergman almost on a weekly basis for the work and materials 
he provided to Ms. Burke's home. Id. 
24. The total payments from Ms. Burke to Mr. Bergman, prior to the conclusion of the 
work performed, equals $5,220.00. Id. 
25. The balance owing to Mr. Bergman was $7,500.00 (the total for the work and 
materials provided by Mr. Bergman) minus $5,220.00 (the amount already paid by Ms. Burke) 
equals $2,280.00. Id. 
26. Mr. Bergman received $2,280.00 of the $28,675.00 that was deposited with the 
court. Id. 
27. Ms. Burke received the balance of the $28,675.00 deposited with the court, or 
$26,395.00. Id. 
28. The evidence of the payments to Mr. Bergman consisted of trial exhibits and 
direct testimony from Mr. Isbell, Ms. Burke, and Mr. Bergman's brother, Josh Bergman. Record 
at page 313. Mr. Bergman did not request a transcript of the trial to help him marshal the 
evidence in support of his positions and therefore, the record does not contain specific testimony 
of Mr. Isbell, Ms. Burke, and Mr. Bergman's brother, Josh Bergman. 
29. The cash payments, including the two checks, which Mr. Bergman brought to the 
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court's attention after the trial, were identified in the trial exhibits and discussed in direct and 
cross examination of Mr. Isbell, Ms. Burke, and Mr. Bergman's brother, Josh Bergman. Id. 
30. Mr. Bergman filed his Motion Presenting New Conclusive Evidence Relating to 
the Defendant Committing Fraud upon the Court ("Motion"), on or about April 3, 2008. Record 
at pages 530 - 31. His Motion was made pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b). 
31. Mr. Bergman filed his Request to Submit for Decision on Mr. Bergman's Motion 
Presenting New Conclusive Evidence Relating to the Defendant Committing Fraud upon the 
Court on April 21, 2008. Record at pages 553 - 54. 
32. On August 1, 2008, Mr. Bergman filed his Motion to Remove Stay on Judgment 
and supporting memorandum. Record at pages 592 - 96. 
33. The district court complied with Mr. Bergman's wish and issued its Ruling 
Denying Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion on August 7, 2008 ("Ruling") Record at pages 597 - 99. 
34. Mr. Bergman failed to propound any interrogatories, admissions, or request for 
production of documents to Ms. Burke during the prosecution of his lien foreclosure case. There 
are no certificates of service for any discovery in the whole file form Mr. Bergman. See Record. 
35. To the best of Ms. Burke's counsel's knowledge, this is the only case he has ever 
been involved with that was assigned to Judge Baldwin. 
36. Mr. Bergman has failed to marshal any evidence of his claims and allegations. 
37. Mr. Bergman did not provide any citations to the record. 
38. Mr. Bergman has failed to demonstrate how, if at all, that he was prejudiced by 
any delay in Judge Baldwin ruling on his Motion. 
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STATUTE AND RULES THAT ARE DETERMINATIVE 
78A-2-201 Powers of every court. 
Every court has authority to: 
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence; 
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person authorized to conduct a 
judicial investigation under its authority; 
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers; 
(4) compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge 
out of court, in a pending action or proceeding; 
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other 
persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every matter; 
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or proceeding, as 
provided by law; 
(7) administer oaths in a pending action or proceeding, and in all other cases where 
necessary in the exercise of its authority and duties; 
(8) amend and control its process and orders to conform to law and justice; 
(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent with law, 
necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and 
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council. 
78A-2-223 Decisions to be rendered within two months — Procedures for decisions 
not rendered. 
(1) A trial court judge shall decide all matters submitted for final determination within 
two months of submission, unless circumstances causing the delay are beyond the judge's 
personal control. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall establish reporting procedures for all matters not decided 
within two months of final submission. 
76-2-304 Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable 
mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no 
defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not 
constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by 
an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; 
or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record or 
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made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute a defense to 
the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which he 
would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Delay in execution. No execution or other writ to enforce a judgment may issue until the 
expiration often days after entry of judgment, unless the court in its discretion otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution of, or any 
proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter 
or amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or 
order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a 
directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to the findings or for 
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additional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory order or final 
judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend, 
modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as 
it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may 
obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. The bond may be 
given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas 
bond is approved by the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When an appeal is taken by the United States, the 
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by direction of any department of either, and 
the operation or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security 
shall be required from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping, 
intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or military, within this state, the 
execution of the judgment shall not be stayed on an appeal. 
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions in this rule do not limit any power of an 
appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay proceedings or to suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an injunction, or extraordinary relief or to make any order appropriate to preserve the 
status quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered. 
(h) Stay of judgment upon multiple claims. When a court has ordered a final judgment on some 
but not all of the claims presented in the action under the conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the 
court may stay enforcement of that judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgment or 
judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the 
party in whose favor the judgment is entered. 
(i) Form of supersedeas bond; deposit in lieu of bond; waiver of bond; jurisdiction over sureties 
to be set forth in undertaking. 
(i)(l) A supersedeas bond given under Subdivision (d) may be either a commercial bond having a 
surety authorized to transact insurance business under Title 31 A, or a personal bond having one 
or more sureties who are residents of Utah having a collective net worth of at least twice the 
amount of the bond, exclusive of property exempt from execution. Sureties on personal bonds 
shall make and file an affidavit setting forth in reasonable detail the assets and liabilities of the 
surety. 
(i)(2) Upon motion and good cause shown, the court may permit a deposit of money in court or 
other security to be given in lieu of giving a supersedeas bond under Subdivision (d). 
(i)(3) The parties may by written stipulation waive the requirement of giving a supersedeas bond 
under Subdivision (d) or agree to an alternate form of security. 
(i)(4) A supersedeas bond given pursuant to Subdivision (d) shall provide that each surety 
submits to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as the 
surety's agent upon whom any papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond may be served, 
and that the surety's liability may be enforced on motion and upon such notice as the court may 
require without the necessity of an independent action. 
(j) Amount of supersedeas bond. 
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(j)(l) Except as provided in subsection (j)(2), a court shall set the supersedeas bond in an amount 
that adequately protects the judgment creditor against loss or damage occasioned by the appeal 
and assures payment in the event the judgment is affirmed. In setting the amount, the court may 
consider any relevant factor, including: 
(j)(l)(A) the judgment debtor's ability to pay the judgment; 
(j)(l)(B) the existence and value of security; 
(j)(l)(C) the judgment debtor's opportunity to dissipate assets; 
(j)(l)(D) the judgment debtor's likelihood of success on appeal; and 
(j)(l)(E) the respective harm to the parties from setting a higher or lower amount. 
(j)(2) Notwithstanding subsection (])(!)'• 
(j)(2)(A) the presumptive amount of a bond for compensatory damages is the amount of the 
compensatory damages plus costs and attorney fees, as applicable, plus 3 years of interest at the 
applicable interest rate; 
(j)(2)(B) the bond for compensatory damages shall not exceed $25 million in an action by 
plaintiffs certified as a class under Rule 23 or in an action by multiple plaintiffs in which 
compensatory damages are not proved for each plaintiff individually; and 
(j)(2)(C) no bond shall be required for punitive damages. 
(j)(3) If the court permits a bond that is less than the presumptive amount of compensatory 
damages, the court may also enter such orders as are necessary to protect the judgment creditor 
during the appeal. 
(j)(4) If the court finds that the judgment debtor has violated an order or has otherwise dissipated 
assets, the court may set the bond under subsection (j)(l) without regard to the limits in 
subsection (j)(2). 
(k) Objecting to sufficiency or amount of security. Any party whose judgment is stayed or sought 
to be stayed pursuant to Subdivision (d) may object to the sufficiency of the sureties on the 
supersedeas bond or the amount thereof, or to the sufficiency or amount of other security given to 
stay the judgment by filing and giving notice of such objection. The party so objecting shall be 
entitled to a hearing thereon upon five days notice or such shorter time as the court may order. 
The burden of justifying the sufficiency of the sureties or other security and the amount of the 
bond or other security, shall be borne by the party seeking the stay, unless the objecting party 
seeks a bond greater than the presumed limits of this rule. The fact that a supersedeas bond, its 
surety or other security is generally permitted under this rule shall not be conclusive as to its 
sufficiency or amount. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Bergman's asserts in his appellate brief that the district court abused it discretion in 
several ways when it ruled on his Motion Presenting New Conclusive Evidence Relating to the 
Defendant Committing Fraud upon the Court, on or about April 3, 2008. Record at pages 530 -
31. He did not order a transcript of the trial or provide any transcript of any portion of the 
proceedings to this Court. Mr. Bergman has chosen to make his arguments without providing 
this Court with the trial testimony of any of the witnesses. The trial court was provided on a 
copy of a compact disc, which included the whole two day trial in audio form. He asked the trial 
court to listen to specific sections of trial in order to support his Motion. Further, Mr. Bergman 
did not make one citation to the Record at all in his brief. He also failed to marshal any evidence 
in support of his claims that the district court abused its discretion when it issued its Ruling 
Denying Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion on August 7, 2008. Record at pages 597 - 99. 
Simply put, Mr. Bergman has failed to carry his burden of demonstrate that the district 
court abused its discretion in any way as it related to the trial and/or his Motion. Additionally, 
Mr. Bergman did not demonstrate how if at all, he was prejudiced by any of the claimed abuses 
of discretion committed by the trial court. If there were errors committed by Judge Baldwin, 
those errors were harmless at best. Certainly none of the claimed errors caused Mr. Bergman any 
injury or prejudice. 
Judge Baldwin conducted himself and directed the business of the district court properly 
under all applicable Utah Statutes, case, and Rules. He did not violate any of the Canons of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Baldwin and counsel for Ms. Burke never had an ex parte 
communication concerning this case or any other case. All communications between counsel and 
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Judge Baldwin were pursuant to all guidelines set forth in the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct and 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Neither Judge Baldwin or Ms. Burke's counsel violated 
any of the applicable Rules governing their conduct or the procedures set forth for the fair and 
unbiased prosecution of this case. All Rules were followed and all proprieties were observed. 
Neither counsel for Ms. Burke nor Judge Baldwin committed any inappropriate act or committed 
any crime as defined by the Utah Code during the course of this case or in dealing with Mr. 
Bergman and his case. 
Ms. Burke and/or her counsel did not commit fraud of any type or on the court. Ms. 
Burke did not give false testimony concerning any aspect of her defense to Mr. Bergman's lien 
foreclosure action. Ms. Burke did not ask or solicit false testimony form any of the witnesses 
called on her half at the trail in this matter. Counsel for Ms. Burke did not ask or solicit false 
testimony form any of the witnesses called on her behalf at the trail in this matter. He is not 
aware of any evidence offered to the trial court that was false. All material information presented 
at trial was corroborated by more than one witness and by more than one exhibit. Ms Burke's 
counsel did not violate any of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or any other rules governing the conduct of attorneys in the State of Utah. He has 
always been civil to Mr. Bergman and conducted himself with candor toward Mr. Bergman and 
the trial court. 
The Judge Baldwin heard both the direct and cross examination of all witnesses. He also 
was able to assess the demeanor of those same witnesses as was as all of Mr. Bergman's 
witnesses. Judge Baldwin evaluated the credibility of each and every witness that testified the 
trial on November 13 and 14, 2007. He found that Mr. Isbell's testimony was the "most 
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credible" of all of the witnesses at the trial. Record at pages 375 at paragraph 4. Evaluating 
witnesses and determining credibility is one of the most important duties and/or responsibilities 
of a trial court. Judge Baldwin performed his job and responsibilities professionally and within 
the guidelines set froth in the State of Utah. 
Ms. Burke requests that this Court deny Mr. Bergman's appeal. She also asked this Court 
to grant her fees and costs on appeal pursuant to the Appellate Rule. 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Bergman did not order a transcript of the trial. He has chosen to make his arguments 
without providing this Court with the trial testimony of any of the witnesses. Mr. Bergman did 
not make one citation to the Record at all in his brief. He also did not provide a transcript to the 
trial court to support his Motion. He failed to marshal any evidence in support of his claims that 
the district court abused its discretion. Rather, Mr. Bergman presents his argument that he did 
not need to marshal any evidence in support of his claims, because the district court's finding are 
"legally insufficient." See Campbell v.Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Mr. 
Bergman continues to ignore the Record. 
In essence, Mr. Bergman's Motion argue the same points and facts as his Motion to Alter 
or Amend a Judgment pursuant to Rule 59. Record at pages 381 - 86. He has failed to provide 
this Court with any additional or adequate information or evidence to support his motions for 
relief from the Judgment. 
Mr. Bergman's argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
Particularly, "[bjriefs must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. An 
issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the 
burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, P 
13, 72 P.3d 138 (citing Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, P 8, 995 P.2d 14). 
A. Standard of Review under Rule 60(b). 
A district court has broad discretion to rule on a motion to set aside a default judgment 
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under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, P 9, 11 
P.3d 277; Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984); State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983). The appellate courts in Utah review a district 
court's decision on a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment under an abuse of discretion 
standard. See Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,PP54-55, 150 P.3d 480; Lund, 2000 UT 75, P 9, 
11 P.3d 277; Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 
(Utah 1986); Russell, 681 P.2d at 1194; see also Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 
2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973) ("The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule 
60(b)(1),... and the [appellate] court will reverse the trial court only where an abuse of this 
discretion is clearly established."). "'An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the 
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propriety of the denial or grant of relief,'" and thus '"is narrow in scope.'" Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, PI9, 2 P.3d 451 ("An appeal of a Rule 60(b) 
order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. . . . [and] does not, at least in 
most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was sought." (quoting 
12 James Wm. Moore et al, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.41 [l][a] (3d ed. 1999)). When 
reviewing a decision under Rule 60(b), the court should not address the merits of the underlying 
judgment from which the appellant seeks relief. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., 2000 UT 
App 110, P19, 2 P.3d 451 ("An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the 
denial or grant of relief. . . . [and] does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the 
underlying judgment from which relief was sought." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
However, the court can "reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was 
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sought," id., to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. See Lund, 2000 UT 75 
at P9 ("A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse of 
discretion."). The "court's ruling must be 'based on adequate findings of fact' and 'on the law,'" 
thus, "[a] decision premised on flawed legal conclusions . . . constitutes an abuse of discretion." 
See Lund, 2000 UT 75, P9, 11 P.3d 277. 
B. Mr. Bergman's right to relief under Rule 60(b). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make it possible to gain relief from a judgment under 
certain circumstances. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . ; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); . . .; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or (6) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (2), and (6). The only claim in Mr. Bergman's Motion was that Ms. 
Burke committed fraud on the court. Record at pages 530 - 31. Therefore, Mr. Bergman's Rule 
60(b) Motion was made under subsection 3 for fraud and none of the other subsections. His 
Motion also included claims against Ms. Burke's counsel for allegedly helping her commit fraud 
on the court or engaged in misrepresentation or other misconduct. 
During the trial, Mr. Bergman's counsel did not object to any of the exhibits offered by 
Ms. Burke. The trial court received all of the exhibits and followed along with those exhibits as 
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testimony was given by both parties witnesses. It should be remembered that Mr. Bergman had 
no contemporaneous records for the testimony he gave concerning the 1,200 hours he alleged and 
estimated to have worked on Ms. Burke's real property. Therefore, he failed his own standard of 
proof. He only had his oral testimony to support his claimed hours. 
In support of his 60(b) motion Mr. Bergman filed his Affidavit in Support of Motion 
Presenting New Conclusive Evidence "(Bergman Affidavit"). Record at pages 518 - 29. In the 
Bergman Affidavit at paragraph 9 on page 2, Mr. Bergman claims that there were two checks 
missing from Exhibit D13. Record at pages 519. After he received the check from his 
subpoena, he recognized that check number 3311 had bee written to him and he had endorsed 
that check. See Bergman Affidavit at paragraph 10 on page 3. Record at pages 520. In other 
words, check number 3311 was acceptable to Mr. Bergman. Ms. Burke claimed in Exhibit D14 
that checks were paid to Mr. Bergman. On that Exhibit were several payments to Mr. Bergman 
in cash rather than by check. A mistake was made as to check number 3348, which was not 
identified as a payment in cash to Mr. Bergman. Mr. Isbell testified that he wrote the check and 
cashed it in order to get $500.00 in cash to give to Mr. Bergman at his request. Mr. Isbell also 
wrote a check to Josh Bergman, Mr. Bergman's brother in order for Josh to cash the check and 
provide the cash to Mr. Bergman. Both Josh Bergman and Mr. Isbell testified to this transaction. 
Mr. Bergman received payments by check, cash transfers from Ms. Burke's account to Mr. 
Bergman's account, in cash. Payments depended on the specific circumstances and the requests 
o^Mr. Bergman. The fact that check number 3348 was not included in Exhibit D13 does not 
change he fact that Mr. Isbell testified to the transaction and the copy of the check would not 
have changed the fact that Mr. Bergman received $500.0 form Mr. Isbell on June 7, 2003. The 
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statements provided in Exhibit D12 also showed the transaction. There was not fraud on the trial 
court with respect to check number 3348. The bank statements corroborated th testimony of Mr. 
Isbell and were consistent with the fact set forth in his testimony. Ms. Burke testified as to the 
true and correct nature of the bank statements. It should be remember that the Plaintiff 
propounded no discovery to Ms. Burke in this case. No interrogatories, no admissions, and no 
request for production of documents were ever submitted to Ms. Burke. During the course the 
litigation of this case. Even in the Plaintiffs Motion, he asked the trial court to listen to the CD 
he provided of the trial. He did not have those sections transcribed. Mr. Bergman has the duty to 
marshal all of the evidence to support his allegations and identify where in the Record, the trial 
court abused its discretion, he has not even attempted to cite the Record. Now he asked this 
Court to seek out any facts that may tend to support his wild and bare allegation in his Motion. 
This Court should decline to perform Mr. Bergman's job of identifying any errors in the Record 
or trial. There were no errors to locate. 
However, if this Court chooses to consider Mr. Bergman's claims that the evidence is 
"new conclusive evidence" which he discovered after the trial, then it should be noted again, that 
Mr. Bergman conducted no discovery during the course of prosecuting his case. He failed to 
asked any admission, interrogatories, or requests for production of documents to Ms. Burke 
during any time during the litigation. Mr. Bergman could have discovered all documents 
pertinent to Ms. Burke's defense had he conducted any discovery. Mr. Bergman is not entitled to 
the requested relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2). See Promax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 
253 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that newly discovered evidence must be material and 
"substantial enough that with the evidence there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result"). 
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Mr. Bergman also filed a Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Mouton Relating to 
Conclusive Evidence that Defendant Committed Fraud upon the Court ("Memorandum"). 
Record at pages 514 - 17. The Memorandum simply asked that the trial court disallow all cash 
payments to Mr. Bergman, despite the oral testimony to the contrary. Ms. Burke, Mr. Isbell, and 
Josh Bergman all testified to one or more of the cash payment to Mr. Bergman. Mr. Bergman's 
counsel cross examined all of these witnesses. The trial court heard both the direct and cross 
examination of all witnesses. The trail court also was able to assess the demeanor of those same 
witnesses as was as all of Mr. Bergman's witnesses. Judge Baldwin evaluated the credibility of 
each and every witness that testified the trial in November 2007. The trial court found that Mr. 
Isbell's testimony was the "most credible" of all of the witnesses. Record at pages 375 at 
paragraph 4. Mr. Bergman has once again failed to marshal any evidence to support his naked 
allegations that Ms. Burke and her counsel perpetrated a fraud on the trial court. This Court 
should deny Mr. Bergman's appeal. 
C. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion on or about May 12, 2008, when it 
moved sua sponte and stay the Plaintiffs 60(b) Motion? 
Mr. Bergman argues that when the district court stayed his Request to Submit for 
Decision until there was a decision from the Utah Supreme Court was an abuse of the court's 
discretion. It should be remembered that Mr. Bergman did not provide a transcript to this Court 
or even cite to the Record in either of his appeals. He has failed to supply any evidence to 
support the claimed errors or abuse of discretion he attributes the trail court. 
To support his claims that Mr. Bergman was improperly denied the relief he requested in 
his Motion, he had the burden to provide this Court with an adequate record on appeal. See State 
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v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct. 1443, 75 
L. Ed. 2d 799 (1983) (stating when "a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has 
the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate record"; an appellate 
court "simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record"). Mr. Bergman failed to provide an adequate record. He did not 
order a transcript of the proceedings or even cite to the Record. Accordingly, this Court must 
presume the regularity of the district court proceedings. See State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 
152-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (upholding trial court's order because "in the absence of an 
adequate record on appeal, this Court cannot address the issues raised and presume the 
correctness of the disposition made by the trial court"). An abuse of the trial court's discretion 
may be found where the court's determination of reasonableness is unsupported by evidence in 
the record as explained in the court's findings of fact. Id., Quinn v. Quinn, Jr., 820 P.2d 282 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Mr. Bergman argues that the trial court erred in ruling on and denying his Motion after 
more than two months in violation to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223. Even if Mr. Bergman is 
correct in his assertion that the trial court abused its discretion by making this ruling, his 
argument fails to demonstrate how this alleged error was harmful or prejudicial to him in any 
way. "Harmless error is defined . . . as an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) (quotations and 
citations omitted); see also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989) ("Errors we label 
harmless' are errors which . . . are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
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reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."). "Put in other 
| I 
words, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine our confidence in the verdict." Id. "On appeal, the appellant has the burden of 
demonstrating an error was prejudicial-that there is a reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quotations and citation omitted), atfd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). Mr. 
Bergman argues that when the district court stayed ruling on his Motion until there was a 
decision from the Utah Supreme Court was an abuse of the court's discretion. Because Mr. 
Bergman has failed to carry his burden under the harmless error analysis by demonstrating that 
the alleged error committed by the trial court was prejudicial, his argument is without merit and 
this Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court. 
D, Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it elected to not inform the 
Plaintiff or issue a court order detailing the grounds for the stay? 
Mr. Bergman argues that when the district court stayed ruling on his Motion until there 
was a decision from the Utah Supreme Court was an abuse of the court's discretion. The rial 
court is responsible for its own calendar and managing its case load. The trial court was well 
within it discretion to delay its ruling on Mr. Bergman's Rule 60(b) Motion. District courts 
typically do not inform parties of the reasoning behind, they take motions and other procedural 
issues under advisement. Assuming that Mr. Bergman is correct in his assertion that the trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to "not inform the Plaintiff or issue a court order detailing 
the grounds for the stay," his argument fails to demonstrate how this alleged error, if it is an 
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error, was harmful or prejudicial to him. "Harmless error is defined . . . as an error that is 
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." Crookston, 817 P.2d 789, 796. "On appeal, the 
appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial—that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Steffensen, 820 P.2d 482, 489. 
Mr. Bergman failed to provide this Court with any information and/or evidence that he 
was prejudiced by any abuse of discretion by Judge Baldwin's not providing Mr. Bergman with 
notice of the "stay" or issuing a court order "detailing the grounds for the stay." 
E. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and/or commit a crime and/or divest 
its jurisdiction over the 60(b) motion when the Trial Court violated Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-2-223(l)? 
Mr. Bergman claims that since the district court did not rule on his Motion within the two 
month window as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223, that the trial court losses 
jurisdiction to issue a decision or ruling on Mr. Bergman's Motion and/or committed a crime. 
He has failed to point to any Utah Statute, Utah case law, or Utah Rule which divests the trial 
court on jurisdiction for no ruling on a motion submitted to it for more than two months. The 
trial court's not ruling on his Motion for more than two months may have been inconvenient or 
caused some delay, but was certainly not a crime under any legal authority in Utah. The penalty 
to a district court for not making its ruling in a timely fashion is to be required to report to the 
Judicial Council and/or the Utah Supreme Court that he was not following the proscribed 
procedures. 
The Court should remember that there was never any ex parte communications between 
Ms. Burke's counsel and Judge Baldwin as asserted by Mr. Bergman. He reaches the conclusion 
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that there must of have been an ex parte discussion between Ms. Burke's counsel and Judge 
Baldwin through his analysis of the district court's docket. The court's docket and his 
interpretation of the docket is the only information he provides to this Court to support his wild 
claims. 
Mr. Bergman has failed to demonstrate to this Court that Judge Baldwin's decision or 
ruling on his Motion would have been different if the decision had been made within the two 
month window as proscribe by Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223. Mr. Bergman filed his Motion 
Presenting New Conclusive Evidence Relating to the Defendant Committing Fraud upon the 
Court ("Motion"), on or about April 3, 2008. Record at pages 530 - 31. His Motion was made 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b). Mr. Bergman filed his Request to Submit 
for Decision Mr. Bergman's Motion Presenting New Conclusive Evidence Relating to the 
Defendant Committing Fraud upon the Court on April 21, 2008. Record at pages 553 - 54. On 
August 1, 2008, Mr. Bergman filed his Motion to Remove Stay on Judgment and supporting 
memorandum. Record at pages 592 - 96. The district court complied with Mr. Bergman's wish 
and issued it decision on August 7, 2008. Record at pages 597 - 99. Had the district court 
followed Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223 to the letter, it would have issued its decision on the Mr. 
Bergman's Motion would have been issued on or about June 20, 2008. Instead, the trial court 
issued its Denying Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion on August 7, 2008, 48 days after the end of the 
two months. The total time between Mr. Bergman filing his Request for Decision and the trial 
court's Ruling Denying Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion was only 108 days. Mr. Bergman claims 
that Judge Baldwin committed a crime by the delay of issuing his Ruling. He however, does not 
provide any legal authority to support this position. This Court should deny Mr. Bergman's 
appeal and should affirm the Ruling of the trial court. 
35 
F. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion (after it violated 78A-2-223(l) when 
it issued a ruling upon the 60(b) motion? 
a. without showing that it had jurisdiction? 
b. without showing that the circumstances causing the delay were legally 
beyond the judge's personal control? 
c. without receiving procedures from the Utah Judicial Council? 
As discussed earlier in this Brief, Judge Baldwin did not lose jurisdiction to rule on Mr. 
Bergman's pending Motion. Since the trial court did not lose its jurisdiction, then there would be 
no reason that the district court would set forth any details of its jurisdiction, it still had 
jurisdiction to rule on Mr. Bergman's Motion. The trial court also did not need to "showing that 
the circumstances causing the delay were legally beyond the judge's personal control" or it need 
to receive "procedures from the Utah Judicial Council." None of Mr. Bergman's claimed errors 
was an abuse of Ihe trial court's discretion. 
Mr. Bergman did not marshal any evidence in support of his allegations of the alleged 
"violation" of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-223(l). Further, he has completely failed to provide any 
direction in the record to back up his claims. He has not cited to the Record even one time. He 
has given this Court precious little to review in order to evaluate his assertions of error by Judge 
Baldwin. Mr. Bergman has presented no evidence of violation of any Utah Statute, Rule or case 
law by any of the district court personnel. His claims are bare allegations without any factual 
support in the Record and he has failed to present any "new" information that would support his 
beliefs. Mr. Berman's appeal should be denied and the trial court's Ruling dated August 7, 2008, 
should be affirmed. 
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G. Did Trial Court exceed the bounds of sound discretion in denying Plaintiffs 
60(b) motion, without reviewing all evidence, without a hearing or without 
considering any argument from the opposing party? 
The trial Court issued its Ruling Denying Plaintiffs Rule 60 (b) Motion on or about 
August 7, 2008. It should be noted that Mr. Bergman's Rule 60(b) Motion was evaluated under 
subsection (b)(2) "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)," and subsection (3) "fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party." In the Ruling, the district court reasoned that: 
Plaintiff alleges that witnesses for the Defendant [Ms. Burke] lied at trial, and 
provides "newly discovered" evidence of this [sic] a check of a check. However, 
Plaintiffs evidence fails to prove that Defendant's witnesses gave false testimony. 
Further, Plaintiff does not allege or show that the evidence could not have 
previously been discovered. 
Ruling at Record 598. Mr. Bergman did not provide a transcript of the appropriate portions of 
the trial, which he attempts to challenge through his Motion filed with the district court. He 
neglected to meet the standard for a court granting a Rule 60(b) motion. There is nothing in the 
Ruling that suggests that the trial court did not review the file and its not of the trial, or that it did 
not review all relevant materials to making it decision, including Ms. Burke's opposition to that 
Motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, even if it did decide the Ruling "without 
reviewing all evidence, without a hearing or without considering any argument from the 
opposing party." Mr. Bergman has furnished no evidence, information, or citations to the 
Record, which would demonstrate that the district court's Ruling was made, "without reviewing 
all evidence, without a hearing or without considering any argument from the opposing party." 
"Unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually 
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considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve the controversy, 
but simply failed to note on the record the factual determination it made." Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 
963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Based on Mr. Bergman's failure, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, 
this Court should deny Mr. Bergman's appeal and affirm the trial court's Ruling of August 7, 
2008. 
H. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it found, "However, Plaintiffs 
evidence fails to prove that the Defendant's witnesses gave false testimony." 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that, "Plaintiffs evidence fails to 
prove that the Defendant's witnesses gave false testimony." Mr. Bergman did not provide a 
transcript to the trial court along with his Motion. The district court was at the trial in November 
2007, and was able to observe the witnesses' demeanor and assess their credibility. The 
testimony and evidence received by the trial court was not false. Mr. Isbell, Ms. Burke, and Josh 
Bergman all testified to payments made to Mr. Bergman via checks, bank transfers, and cash. By 
way of corroboration, Ms. Burke offered as evidence at the trial copies of her bank statements 
showing each one of the transactions claimed to be a payment to Mr. Bergman. The bank 
statements clearly showed checks that were written to cash, the bank transfers, and the checks 
paid to Mr. Bergman. That evidence was received by the trial court without objection by Mr. 
Bergman. 
The "newly discovered evidence" by Mr. Bergman could have been discovered through 
the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure. Mr. Bergman failed to conduct any discovery pursuant to 
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those Rules. No interrogatories, request for production of documents, or admissions were ever 
sbrved on Ms. Burke by Mr. Bergman. Most if not all of the trial witnesses were identified in 
Ms. Burke Initial Disclosures. She identified all trial witnesses in her witness list provided to the 
trial court and Mr. Bergman's counsel. Mr. Bergman attached two checks that had been 
invariantly left out of the trial exhibit. One of the checks confirmed a payment to Mr. Bergman 
and included his endorsement on the back of that check. The second check showed a check 
written to cash and endorsed by Mr. Isbell. Ms. Isbell testified that he wrote the check for cash 
and cashed that check in order to comply with Mr. Bergman's request to receive a cash payment 
rather than have to cash the check himself. As was seen from the exhibits and the testimony of 
Ms. Burke's witnesses, Mr. Bergman often either requested cash or accepted cash as a payment 
for his work on Ms. Burke's property. There was nothing unusual about Mr. Bergman receiving 
or requesting cash as payment during the course of the work on Ms. Burke's property. 
Without anymore information or "evidence" to support his Motion, Mr. Bergman claims 
that he should have prevailed on his Motion and because he did not, that constitutes an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. Simply put, Mr. Bergman was not happy with the outcome of the 
trial or of any of his post-trial motions. His appeals both lack enough specificity to allow this 
Court to set aside the trial court's ruling or the Judgment entered by that court. Therefore this 
Court should deny his appeal and affirm the trial court's Ruling on Mr. Bergman's Rule 60(b) 
Motion. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and arguments set forth herein, Ms. Burke hereby request that this 
Court dismiss Mr. Bergman's appeal in it's entirety for failing to marshal all of the evidence 
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challenging the trial court's decision on his Rule 60(b) Motion. Ms. Burke asked this Court to 
grant her fees and costs on appeal pursuant to the Appellate Rule and grant all other relief this 
Court deems just and appropriate. 
Respectfully Submitted this 4th day of February 2009. 
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